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RING AROUND THE JURY: REVIEWING
FLORIDA’S CAPITAL SENTENCING
FRAMEWORK IN HURST V. FLORIDA
RICHARD GUYER*
INTRODUCTION
In Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court struck down an Arizona capital
sentencing statute that allowed a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to
find an aggravating factor necessary for imposition of the death penalty.1
The Court held that the jury needed to have found an aggravating factor to
render the defendant eligible for the death penalty.2 In Florida, the jury
plays only an advisory role in the penalty phase. The trial judge is tasked
with making independent findings as to the presence of aggravating factors,
mitigating factors, and the balance between the two.3 Ultimately, the trial
judge decides whether to sentence a defendant to death or life in prison.4
In Hurst v. Florida,5 the Court will review Florida’s death sentencing
scheme to determine whether it violates the Sixth6 or Eighth Amendments.7
Part I of this Commentary describes the factual background of the case.
Part II explains the legal background and the evolution of Sixth and Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. Part III explains the Florida Supreme Court’s
holding in Hurst v. Florida, which affirmed Timothy Hurst’s death
sentence. Part IV outlines the arguments put forth by both parties. Part V
argues that the Supreme Court should accept Petitioner’s arguments and
hold Florida’s capital sentencing framework unconstitutional.
Florida’s capital sentencing framework violates the Sixth Amendment

* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017.
1. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
2. Id.
3. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)–(3) (West 2010).
4. Id.
5. 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”).
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as interpreted in Ring because (1) the trial judge makes the ultimate
decision of whether to find aggravating factors necessary to sentence a
defendant to death and, consequently, (2) the trial judge may override the
jury’s advisory sentencing recommendation. The Florida statute also
violates the Eighth Amendment because death, due to its finality, is a
fundamentally unique punishment in our legal system. A jury, rather than a
judge, better reflects society’s moral views, which are critical to weigh
when deciding whether to impose the death penalty.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On the morning of May 2, 1998, the body of Cynthia Lee Harrison, an
employee at a Popeye’s Fried Chicken restaurant in Escambia County,
Florida, was found in the restaurant’s freezer.8 Her hands were bound with
electrical tape, her mouth was taped shut, and her body was covered with
“a minimum of sixty incised slash and stab wounds” that matched the use
of a box cutter.9
Petitioner Timothy Lee Hurst, Harrison’s co-worker, was charged and
convicted of first-degree murder.10 Despite testimony during the penalty
phase that Hurst was emotionally and mentally impaired, the jury
recommended the death penalty.11 The trial court then sentenced Hurst to
death on its independent finding that the statutory aggravating factors of the
case outweighed any mitigating factors.12 The Florida Supreme Court
affirmed the death sentence,13 and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Hurst’s
petition for a writ of certiorari.14
However, in 2009 the Florida Supreme Court vacated Hurst’s death
sentence on post-conviction review.15 The court held his attorney’s failure
to investigate or present evidence about Hurst’s deficient mental condition
	
  
8. Joint Appendix, Vol. 1, at 28–29, Hurst v. Florida, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015) (No. 14-7505),
2015 WL 5562982, at *28–29 [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
9. Id. at 29.
10. Id. at 32.
11. Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689, 694 (Fla. 2002).
12. Id. The trial court found three aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed by a
person engaged in the commission of a robbery (“great weight”); (2) the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, and cruel (“great weight”); and (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest (“great weight”). The State never argued the avoiding arrest aggravating
circumstance, and the jury never received instruction on it.
13. See Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689, 692 (Fla. 2002).
14. See Hurst v. Florida, 537 U.S. 977 (2002).
15. Joint Appendix, supra note 8, at 127.
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during the initial trial “had an identifiable detrimental effect on the process
of weighing the aggravation and mitigation in this case.”16 Due to this
failure, the court vacated the death sentence and ordered that Hurst be
resentenced.17
On remand to the trial court, the State and defense counsel presented
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to the jury.18 At the
close of this penalty phase, the court instructed the jury that “the final
decision as to which punishment shall be imposed is the responsibility of
the judg . . . [and] the law requires you to render an advisory sentence as to
which punishment shall be imposed.”19 After this instruction, the jury voted
7-5 to recommend the death sentence.20 The verdict did not specify which
aggravating factors the jury had found, and Hurst’s motion for an
interrogatory verdict was denied.21 The trial court then “independently
weigh[ed] the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,”22 and sentenced
Hurst to death.23
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Hurst urged the court to
invalidate Florida’s capital sentencing scheme under Ring v. Arizona.24 The
court ruled against him, citing Supreme Court precedent that had
previously upheld Florida’s capital sentencing scheme.25 Hurst successfully
petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.26
On January 12, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court held Florida’s capital
sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment in an 8-1 decision.27

	
  
16. Id. at 190. In addition to brain abnormalities consistent with fetal alcohol syndrome, Hurst’s
mental deficiencies were reflected in “an IQ of somewhere between 70 and 78” and “below average
adaptive functioning skills.” Id. at 179–87.
17. Id. at 191.
18. Id. at 296.
19. Id. at 207.
20. Id. at 24–25.
21. Id. at 307.
22. Id. at 259.
23. Id. at 271.
24. Id. at 307.
25. See Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 437 (Fla. 2014). Cf. Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638,
640–41 (1989) (“The Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the
imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury.”), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616
(2016).
26. See Hurst v. Florida, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015) (granting certiorari).
27. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Florida’s Capital Sentencing Framework
In Florida, the death penalty is administered only “if the proceeding
held to determine sentencing . . . results in findings by the court that such
person shall be punished to death.”28
Following the conviction phase, “a separate sentencing proceeding . . .
shall be conducted by the [same] trial judge before the [same] trial jury.”29
In that sentencing proceeding, “the jury shall deliberate and render an
advisory sentence to the court.”30 The jury must base its recommendation
on “[w]hether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist”31 and “whether
sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances.”32 For a death sentence, only “a majority vote is
necessary,”33 but “[n]othing in [Florida law] . . . requires a majority of the
jury to agree on which aggravating circumstances exist.”34 Additionally, a
trial court cannot require “a special verdict form that details the jurors’
votes on specific aggravating circumstances.”35
However, “[n]otwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the
jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death.”36 If
the court chooses death, “it shall set forth in writing its findings upon
which the sentence of death is based,” including aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.37 The court “is not bound by the jury’s recommendation,”38
but must accord the jury’s recommendation “great weight and serious
consideration.”39 Further, “the trial court is required to make independent
	
  
28. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(1) (West 2014).
29. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West 2010).
30. Id. § 921.141(2).
31. Id. § 921.141(2)(a); see also id. § 921.141(5) (enumerating statutory aggravating
circumstances).
32. Id. § 921.141(2)(b); see also id. § 921.141(6) (enumerating statutory mitigating
circumstances).
33. Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 205 (Fla. 2010).
34. State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 544 (Fla. 2006) (emphasis in original).
35. Id. at 548.
36. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3); see also Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring
v. Arizona and the Jury’s Role in Capital Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 553 (2011) (“In
other words, regardless of the decisions of the jury regarding the presence of aggravating factors and the
extent to which they outweigh the case in mitigation, the trial judge is to re-balance these factors and
determine anew whether death or life is merited.”).
37. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3).
38. Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 751 (Fla. 1983).
39. Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191, 1197 (Fla. 1980).
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findings on aggravation, mitigation, and weight.”40 If the trial court decides
that death is the appropriate sentence, the Florida Supreme Court
automatically reviews that decision.41 At that stage, it is the trial court’s
“written findings of fact and the trial record which furnish the basis for [the
Florida Supreme] Court’s review of the death sentence.”42
B. Capital Sentencing and the Sixth Amendment: Ring v. Arizona
1. Capital Sentencing in Arizona Before Ring
Prior to Ring, when a Arizona jury convicted someone of first-degree
murder, the trial judge alone was tasked with finding the aggravating factor
or factors necessary to impose the death penalty. The jury was excluded
from making any findings at the sentencing stage.43 Specifically, the
Arizona statute required the trial judge to “conduct a separate sentencing
hearing to determine the existence or nonexistence of [certain enumerated]
circumstances . . . for the purpose of determining the sentence to be
imposed.”44 An individual could not be given a death sentence “unless at
least one aggravating factor [was] found to exist beyond a reasonable
doubt” by the trial judge.45 Finally, the statute mandated that “[t]he court
alone shall make all factual determinations” when determining if an
aggravating factor is present.46
In Walton v. Arizona,47 the Supreme Court upheld the Arizona scheme
as consistent with the Sixth Amendment “because the additional facts
found by the judge qualified as sentencing considerations, not as
‘element[s] of the offense of capital murder.’”48 Just ten years after Walton,
however, the Supreme Court decided in Apprendi v. New Jersey that the
Sixth Amendment protects a defendant from being “expose[d] . . . to a
penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to
the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.”49 Overruling Walton, the
Apprendi Court held, “[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant’s
	
  
40. Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d 178, 198 (Fla. 2011).
41. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4).
42. Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 839 (Fla. 1988), receded from on other grounds in
Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1997).
43. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588 (2002).
44. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(c) (West 2001), invalidated by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 588 (2002).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
48. Ring, 536 U.S. at 588 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990)).
49. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 (2000).

GUYER	
  FINAL	
  READ_PK.DOCX	
  (DO	
  NOT	
  DELETE)	
  

2016]

5/11/16	
  	
  3:56	
  PM	
  

RING AROUND THE JURY

247

authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no
matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.”50 Importantly, the Court noted “the relevant inquiry is
one not of form, but of effect.”51
2. Ring v. Arizona: Arizona’s Capital Sentencing Scheme Struck Down
In 1996, Timothy Ring was convicted of first-degree murder in the
killing of a Wells Fargo armored van driver.52 Ring’s maximum potential
sentence—life imprisonment—could not be increased to the death penalty
without additional findings of fact.53 The judge then found two aggravating
factors and one mitigating factor, but decided that the mitigating factor did
not “call for leniency.”54 The judge sentenced Ring to death.55
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether that
aggravating factor may be found by the judge . . . or whether the Sixth
Amendment’s jury trial guarantee . . . requires that the aggravating factor
determination be entrusted to the jury.”56 Ring recognized that Apprendi
was “irreconcilable” with Walton.57 The Court acknowledged the
importance of stare decisis, but noted it has “overruled prior decisions
where the necessity and propriety has been established.”58 Ring overruled
Walton because it took the jury’s constitutionally mandated fact-finding
role and placed it entirely in the judge’s purview.59 Therefore, in capital
sentencing schemes where aggravating factors “operate as the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment
requires that they be found by a jury.”60
C. Capital Sentencing and the Eighth Amendment: “Death is Different”
The Supreme Court “almost always treats death cases as a class
apart.”61 The Court has consistently held that a state must “minimize the
risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action in imposing the death
	
  
50. Ring, 536 U.S. at 585–86 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482–83).
51. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
52. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 591 (“The jury . . . convicted Ring of felony murder occurring in the
course of armed robbery.”).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 594–95.
55. Id. at 595.
56. Id. at 597 (footnotes omitted).
57. Id. at 589, 609.
58. Id. at 608 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)).
59. Id. at 609 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 647–49 (1990)).
60. Id. (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000)).
61. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286–87 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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penalty” by adding procedural safeguards to its capital sentencing
framework.62 Historically, three justifications—deterrence, incapacitation,
and retribution—have supported the imposition of the death penalty.63
Additionally, the sentence imposed must be reasonable with respect to the
defendant’s background and character, and the crime committed.64
III. HOLDING
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Hurst’s death sentence, citing U.S.
Supreme Court precedent upholding Florida’s capital sentencing
framework.65 The court distinguished Florida’s sentencing procedures from
those in Ring v. Arizona because “Florida’s sentencing procedures do
provide for jury input[,] . . . a process that was completely lacking in the
Arizona statute struck down in Ring.”66 The dissent noted that “the jury
recommended death by the slimmest margin permitted under Florida
law . . . seven-to-five . . . [making it] actually possible that there was not
even a majority of jurors who agreed that the same aggravator applied,”
thereby violating Ring.67
The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Florida Supreme Court, holding
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional for violating the Sixth
Amendment.68 The Court determined that the trial judge, not the jury, had
found the facts necessary to authorize Hurst’s death sentence, thus violating
Ring’s clear requirement.69 The Court rejected Florida’s arguments, ruling
that a jury’s advisory recommendation is insufficient to support imposing
the death sentence.70

	
  
62. Brief of Amici Curiae Former Florida Circuit Court Judges in Support of Petitioner at 7,
Hurst v. Florida, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015) (No. 14-7505), 2015 WL 3623138, at *7 (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188–89 (1976)).
63. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183–84, 183 n.28 (1976) (explaining the reasoning
behind each of the justifications).
64. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545
(1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
65. Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 446 (Fla. 2014). The Florida Supreme Court based its decision
on Hildwin v. Florida, which held that “the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings
authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury.” Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S.
638, 640–41 (1989), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
66. Hurst, 147 So. 3d at 447.
67. Id. at 449 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
69. Id. at 622.
70. Id.
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IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Hurst’s Arguments
Hurst argued that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth
and Eighth Amendments. In formulating his Sixth Amendment challenge,
Hurst singled out the jury’s “advisory role” as being especially problematic
in light of Ring v. Arizona.71 Hurst proceeded to argue that, in Florida, the
trial judge’s independent finding of statutory aggravating factors
impermissibly abrogates the jury’s essential function as the fact-finder.72
Hurst contended that Arizona’s and Florida’s capital sentencing statutes are
not materially different, and because Ring invalidated Arizona’s statute, it
should also invalidate Florida’s.73
Tracing the history of the Sixth Amendment, Hurst argued that the jury
has always played an essential fact-finding role in capital sentencing
cases.74 Further, Hurst argued that, although stare decisis is normally
adhered to, it “is at its nadir in cases concerning procedural rules that
implicate fundamental constitutional protections.”75 Therefore, the Court
should overturn its decision in Hildwin v. Florida and strike down Florida’s
capital sentencing scheme.76
Second, Hurst argued that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme “assigns
to the judge the power to impose the death penalty,” thereby violating the
Eighth Amendment.77 Hurst looked to the Court’s “three guideposts of . . .
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence—history, current practice, and
independent judgment”—to conclude that “juries, not judges, must be
responsible for imposing the death penalty.”78 Hurst borrowed the
reasoning from Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Ring, in which he
asserted that retribution is the only constitutionally permissible basis for the
death penalty, and that jurors are superior to judges in making that
determination.79
	
  
71. See Brief for Petitioner at 14, Hurst v. Florida, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015) (No. 14-7505), 2015
WL 3523406, at *14 (“[T]he jury makes no express findings as to aggravating factors, and its
recommendation of death is neither necessary nor sufficient for imposition of the death sentence.”).
72. See id. at 22 (arguing that “jury input” does not satisfy Ring or the Sixth Amendment).
73. Id. at 23.
74. See id. at 24 (discussing the jury’s “traditional” role as the fact-finder at the time of the
ratification of the Sixth Amendment).
75. See id. at 24–25 (quoting Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2163 n.5 (2013)).
76. Id. at 25–26.
77. Id. at 26.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 30 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614–15 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“Of the principal functions of criminal sentencing . . . only retribution provides a constitutionally
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Finally, the American Bar Association,80 Former Justices of the
Supreme Court of Florida,81 Former Florida Circuit Court Judges,82 and the
American Civil Liberties Union83 filed amicus curiae briefs in support of
Hurst arguing for a robust role of juries in capital sentencing.
B. Florida’s Arguments
Florida argued that its capital sentencing scheme is fully compliant
with the requirements of Ring, which are “narrow and specific.”84 Because
Florida’s framework “still provides for a jury determination of whether
there is at least one aggravating circumstance,”85 the jury’s finding of at
least one aggravating circumstance would make the defendant eligible for
the death penalty.86 At that point, the judge’s findings cannot enhance the
maximum penalty available.87 Instead, Florida argued, the judge’s factfinding ability would afford the defendant greater protection.88 To counter
Hurst’s assertion that a judge may impose the death penalty even when the
jury recommends life, Florida underlined the rarity of such an occurrence,
pointing out that the last time a judge overrode a jury’s life
recommendation was in 1999.89 Moreover, the Court has consistently
	
  
defensible basis for application of the death penalty . . . [and] jurors possess an important comparative
advantage over judges.”)).
80. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner, Hurst v. Florida,
135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015) (No. 14-7505), 2015 WL 3623139 (arguing that a unanimous vote is required
when a capital sentencing jury finds and weigh aggravating factors, or recommends that a death
sentence should be imposed).
81. Brief of Amici Curiae Former Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida in Support of
Petitioner, Hurst, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (No. 14-7505), 2015 WL 3623137 (arguing that Florida jury
recommendations are “devoid” of factual findings and are “essentially meaningless” for the sentencing
judge) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae Former Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida].
82. Brief of Amici Curiae Former Florida Circuit Court Judges in Support of Petitioner, Hurst,
135 S. Ct. 1531 (No. 14-7505), 2015 WL 3623138 (arguing Florida’s capital sentencing framework
violates the Eighth Amendment because the death penalty has unique features that only a jury is capable
of weighing).
83. Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Florida, and the
Constitutional Accountability Center, in Support of Petitioner, Hurst, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (No. 14-7505),
2015 WL 3608900 (arguing that a unanimous jury verdict is required by Sixth and Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence).
84. Brief for Respondent at 12, Hurst, 135 S. Ct. 1531(No. 14-7505), 2015 WL 4607695, at *12
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
85. Id.
86. Id. at 13.
87. Id.
88. Id. See also Brief of Amici Curiae Alabama and Montana in Support of Respondent, Hurst v.
Florida, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015), 2015 WL 4747983 (arguing that Supreme Court precedent, history, and
policy considerations such as the judge’s “less arbitrary and more consistent” sentencing support
Florida’s capital sentencing framework).
89. Id. at 6.
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upheld Florida’s capital sentencing scheme in precedents such as Hildwin,
characterizing the scheme as placing judge and jury on equal grounds as
“cosentencer[s].”90
V. ANALYSIS
The Court should accept Hurst’s arguments and hold that Florida’s
capital sentencing framework violates the Sixth Amendment based on its
previous holding in Ring v. Arizona. The Court should also hold that
Florida’s scheme violates the Eighth Amendment, but that argument hinges
on less substantial authority. The scheme violates the Sixth Amendment
because (1) the trial judge makes the ultimate decision in finding the
aggravating factors necessary to sentence a defendant to death and,
consequently, (2) the trial judge may override the jury’s advisory
sentencing recommendation. Florida’s statute also raises serious Eighth
Amendment concerns because the imposition of death requires a wholly
different analysis due to its unique finality. Only a jury can reflect society’s
views on the moral decisions that death sentences inevitably involve.
A. Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme Violates the Sixth Amendment
Ring held that any fact that increases the penalty at sentencing beyond
the statutory maximum must be found by the jury.91 Accordingly, Ring
requires a Florida jury to find at least one aggravating factor beyond a
reasonable doubt before a defendant can be sentenced to death. Otherwise,
the maximum punishment a defendant could receive is life imprisonment.
However, a Florida jury serves only an advisory role in sentencing.92
The question of whether there were any aggravating circumstances is
presented to the jury, but no express finding is ever made.93 Although the
trial judge is required to assign “great weight” to the jury’s
determinations,94 the judge cannot possibly know the specifics of the jury’s
findings and makes her own findings.95 As Florida case law notes, “the trial
court is required to make independent findings on aggravation, mitigation,
and weight.”96 The jury’s recommendation therefore has no identifiable
binding effect at the sentencing stage.
	
  
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 13.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2) (West 2010).
See id. (describing determinations of the jury in sentencing as merely “advisory”).
Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191, 1197 (Fla. 1980).
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 2010).
Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d 178, 198 (Fla. 2011).

GUYER	
  FINAL	
  READ_PK.DOCX	
  (DO	
  NOT	
  DELETE)	
  

252

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

5/11/16	
  	
  3:56	
  PM	
  

[VOL. 11

Abrogating the jury’s role as the fact-finder violates the Sixth
Amendment as it was interpreted in Ring. One may imagine a situation in
which the jury first finds no aggravating circumstances, thereby
recommending a life sentence, only to be followed by the trial judge
finding an aggravating circumstance and imposing the death penalty,
despite the jury’s recommendation. As Ring noted, the question is “who
decides, judge or jury.”97 Clearly, in Florida the judge is the one who
decides.
This abrogation is further evidenced by the trial judge’s power to hear
evidence on aggravating and mitigating circumstances not initially
presented to the jury.98 This Spencer v. State hearing further reduces the
jury’s role in the fact-finding process, rendering the jury recommendation
“essentially meaningless.”99 Accordingly, the judge may impose a death
sentence based on evidence of an aggravating circumstance that was never
presented to the jury.100 Furthermore, because the jury is not required to
make specific findings as to each element, the judge does not even receive
an effective recommendation from the jury—she has no idea what
aggravating circumstance the jury potentially found, only that the jury
found something.101 The judge could disagree with the jury, find a different
aggravating circumstance, and still impose the death penalty. More
disconcerting is the fact that even if the jury recommends life, the judge
can separately find a new aggravating circumstance and impose the death
penalty anyways.
This lack of specificity presents further difficulties for Florida’s capital
sentencing framework in light of Ring. As the dissent in the Florida
Supreme Court decision stated, “[It is] actually possible that there was not
even a majority of jurors who agreed that the same aggravator applied.”102
For example, in the event of a 7-5 jury vote recommending death, it is
possible that there were three votes for Aggravator A, four votes for
Aggravator B, and five votes for no aggravators. In that scenario, nine
jurors voted that Aggravator A did not apply, and eight voted that
Aggravator B did not apply. Therefore, it may not be true that “Hurst
	
  
97. Ring, 536 U.S. at 587 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 465, 492 (2000)).
98. See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1993) (specifying that the trial judge must
“afford, if appropriate, both the State and the defendant an opportunity to present additional evidence”).
99. Brief of Amici Curiae Former Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida, supra note 81, at 8.
100. Id. at 3.
101. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990) (“A Florida trial court no more has the
assistance of a jury’s findings of fact with respect to sentencing issues than [did] a trial judge in
Arizona . . . .”).
102. Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 449 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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received a death sentence only after the jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt at least one aggravating circumstance.”103
Finally, stare decisis should not control here. Although the Court has
previously upheld Florida’s capital sentencing scheme in Hildwin v.
Florida, the Court has “overruled prior decisions where the necessity and
propriety of doing so has been established.”104 In Florida, capital
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights are violated. In this system, Florida
judges are permitted to occupy a position that is meant for twelve citizens.
Further, Hildwin was decided before the Court affirmed the right to jury
fact-finding in Ring.
B. Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme Violates the Eighth Amendment
The Court should also strike down Florida’s capital sentencing scheme
as violating the Eighth Amendment. As Justice Breyer stated in his
concurring opinion in Ring, “retribution provides the main justification in
capital punishment, and . . . [the jury has a] comparative advantage in
determining, in a particular case, whether capital punishment will serve that
end.”105 In retributive decisions, jurors are superior because they “reflect
more accurately the composition and experiences of the community as a
whole.”106 Moreover, only the jury can “express the conscience of the
community.”107
Despite this comparative advantage, the judge is the true decision
maker in Florida. Because death’s permanence makes it fundamentally
different from every other form of punishment, morals are heavily involved
in death penalty cases. And because the judge usurps the jury’s rightful role
as the fact-finder in capital cases, defendants in Florida are robbed of their
ability to appeal to the moral inclinations of the members of their
communities. Those moral inclinations may go directly to the heart of
whether something should truly be considered an aggravating or mitigating
factor.
However, it is unlikely that the Court will hold this scheme violates the
Eighth Amendment. The Ring majority never decided whether Arizona’s
	
  
103. Brief for Respondent, supra note 84, at 14.
104. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 (2002) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 172 (1989)).
105. Id. at 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
106. Id. at 615 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 486 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
107. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 30 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519
(1968)).
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scheme violated the Eighth Amendment. Only Justice Breyer’s concurrence
argued that the scheme violated the Eighth Amendment. As no other
justices joined him in that opinion, the chances of others joining him this
time are probably low.
C. Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Recent Ruling
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Florida capital sentencing
scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because it based Hurst’s death
sentence on a judge’s fact-finding, not a jury’s verdict.108 Using reasoning
that closely tracked its decision in Ring, the Court held that in Florida’s
capital sentencing scheme, the jury was not required “to make the critical
findings necessary to impose the death penalty.”109 Further, the Court held
that the Florida capital sentencing scheme’s incorporation of an advisory
jury verdict—a feature that Arizona lacked—was insufficient to satisfy the
Sixth Amendment’s requirements.110
In addition, the Court rejected Florida’s argument for upholding the
capital sentencing scheme on the basis of stare decisis.111 The Court
expressly overruled Hildwin, which had previously held Florida’s capital
sentencing scheme constitutional.112
The majority opinion did not reach the question of the Eighth
Amendment.113 Only Justice Breyer, as in Ring, would have held that the
Florida sentencing scheme violated the Eighth Amendment.114
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Supreme Court should reverse the
holding of the Florida Supreme Court and find that Florida’s capital
sentencing framework violates both the Sixth Amendment in light of the
Court’s ruling in Ring and the Eighth Amendment. Currently, capital
defendants in Florida are being deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to
have a jury determine any fact upon which the death penalty may be
imposed. No longer should Florida be allowed to circumvent this right by
assigning the jury a merely advisory role. As Justice Scalia so pertinently
	
  
108. See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016) (“The Sixth Amendment . . . required Florida
to base Timothy Hurst’s death sentence on a jury’s verdict, not a judge’s factfinding.”).
109. Id. at 622.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 623.
112. See id. (“Time and subsequent cases have washed away the logic of . . . Hildwin.”).
113. Id. at 616.
114. Id. at 624 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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said, the Court should no longer accept “the repeated spectacle of a man’s
going to his death because a judge found that an aggravating factor
existed.”115

	
  
115.

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).

